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¶%ODFN0DLO· 
Networks of Opium and Postal Exchange in Nineteenth-Century India1 
Devyani Gupta 
University of Leeds 
 
'A pipe of old Patna, that soother of all sorrows, the manna of the mind.'2 
 
Introduction 
 
The tragedy associated with the poppy plant has a deep global prehistory rooted in the rise of 
perhaps the most exploitative regime of imperialist expansion, which was unleashed by imperial 
Britain on China and India in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The historical destiny of 
the humble black poppy seed would irreversibly alter the character of local agrarian economy and 
social relations in the Indian subcontinent. Dried resin from the poppy seedpod, manufactured 
into opium balls under the watchful monopoly of the English East India Company (EIC) and 
placed within illicit networks of inter-Asian trade, linked-up with expanding networks of overland 
and overseas communication, setting off a chain of cataclysmic gratefully events which 
transformed all aspects of global political economy across the Indian Ocean region.3 
 
This paper follows the trajectory of nineteenth-century circulatory networks and argues that 
networks of opium trade and smuggling were intertwined with developments in postal 
communication under the expanding (and insidiously penetrating) imperialist agenda of the 
colonial state in India. Biographies of networks of communication, information transmission and 
 
1 The research for this paper was conducted during my stint as the Commonwealth doctoral candidate in 
+LVWRU\ DW WKH 8QLYHUVLW\ RI &DPEULGJH ,·G OLNH WR DFNQRZOHGJH WKH &RPPRQZHDOWK 6FKRODUVKLS
&RPPLVVLRQIRUWKHLUJHQHURXVVXSSRUW,·Pvery grateful to Professor Josephine McDonagh and Dr Briony 
Wickes for their unstinting support and patience in putting together this volume. This paper was first 
SUHVHQWHGDW¶7KH2SLXP:RUNVKRS·RUJDQLVHGE\WKHPLQ.LQJ·V&ROOHJH/RQGRQLQ'HFHPEHU
and my research has benefitted greatly from the stimulating discussions and presentations at the event. ,·G
also like to thank Dr Varun Warrier for his generous help with drafting the accompanying map. Lastly, 
many thanks to the reviewer of this article and their careful reading of the text. 
2 Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China, 1800²42 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 104. 
3 -RKQ5LFKDUGV ¶7KHRSLXP LQGXVWU\ LQ%ULWLVK ,QGLD· Indian Economic and Social History Review, 39:2&3 
(2002), 149²180; ³do³ ¶,QGLDQ(PSLUHDQG3HDVDQW3URGXFWLRQRI2SLXPLQWKH1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\·
Modern Asian Studies, 15:1 (1981), 59²82; Amar Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversions: Colonialism, Indian Merchants 
and the Politics of Opium (Delhi, 1998); ³do³ ¶2SLXP(QWHUSULVHDQG&RORQLDO,QWHUYHQWLRQLQ0DOZDDQG
Western India, 1800-·Indian Economic and Social History Review, 32:4 (1995), 443²7; Hunt Janin, The 
India-China Opium Trade in the Nineteenth Century (North Carolina, 1999); Carl Trocki, Opium, Empire and the 
Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade 1750-1950 (London, 1999). 
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commodity exchange help reframe the nineteenth century as a period of interconnected world 
systems and globalisation.4 This approach prioritises a historical milieu constructed not in specific 
regions or localities but along channels of communication, which were not only the means for 
enabling mobility but were themselves alive and living agents and catalysts of political change. 
 
Consequently, this paper locates the political, extraordinarily, within the physical networks of 
interaction and exchange. By ascertaining the differing agendas and motivations of the colonial 
state in shaping local and imperial practices of rule and governance, and their negotiation with the 
inherent leakages built into local and trans-regional communication systems, this paper highlights 
how networks lent shape and substance to processes of empire building in nineteenth century 
India.5 
 
Networks of Indian opium, c. 19th century: An overview 
 
Commodity trade was a crucial aspect of imperialist expansion and enabled the inter-linking of 
colonial networks of communication. %ULWDLQ·V involvement in opium transmission, which 
emerged from its desire to balance tea trade with China, benefitted immeasurably from advances 
made by the English East India Company in gaining control over the revenue administration of 
the Bengal Presidency in 1764.6 By the early nineteenth century, revenue from opium ranked third 
only to returns from land revenue and salt monopoly.7 British trade in Indian opium involved three 
heads: profits accruing from illicit export of opium produced under state monopoly in Bengal; 
UHYHQXHJDWKHUHGIURPWKHFROOHFWLRQRID¶SDVVIHH·IURPRSLXP-producing regions in Malwa, and 
returns from excise duties on the domestic transport and sale of opium.8 
 
4 Tim Harper and Sunil Amrith (eds.) Sites of Asian Interaction: Ideas, Networks and Mobility (Cambridge, 2014); 
Thomas Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860²1920 (Berkeley, 2007); Durba 
Ghosh and Dane Kennedy (eds.) Decentring empire: Britain, India, and the transcolonial world (London, 2006); 
Christopher Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780²1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Oxford, 
2004). 
5 *XQQHO&HGHUO|I¶3RRU0DQ·V&URS(YDGLQJRSLXPPRQRSRO\·Modern Asian Studies, 53, 2 (2019), 633²
.DWH%RHKPH ¶6PXJJOLQJ,QGLD'HFRQVWUXFWLQJ:HVWHUQ,QGLD·V,OOLFLW([SRUW7UDGH²·
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 3, 25, 4 (2015), 685²&ODXGH0DUNRYLWV¶7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI
2SLXP6PXJJOLQJLQ(DUO\1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\,QGLD/HDNDJHRU5HVLVWDQFH"·Modern Asian Studies, 43, 1 
(2009), 89²111. 
6 &HGHUORI¶3RRU0DQ·V&URS·²4.  
7 5LFKDUGV¶7KHRSLXPLQGXVWU\·²80, 153. 
8 The local consumption of opium in colonial India is an under-researched topic. See, James Mills and 
Patricia Barton (eds.) Drugs and Empire: Essays in Modern Imperialism and Intoxication, c. 1500²1930 (New York, 
2007); Benjamin Broomhall, The truth about opium smoking: with illustrations of the manufacture of opium, etc. 
(London, 1882). 
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The opium enterprise of the Bengal Presidency in eastern India was the main source of colonial 
revenue and opium was manufactured under British supervision exclusively. Opium was produced 
through a forced monopolistic system, whereby advances were paid to state-licensed poppy 
cultivators inhabiting a relatively small area of the eastern Gangetic plains, who, in turn, sold their 
produce at fixed rates to government-appointed opium agents of the Opium Department. This 
resin was processed in the two state-run factories at Ghazipur and Benares in Bihar and Bengal, 
respectively. The opium thus produced was carefully checked and weighed, packed in wooden 
chests and auctioned off to private merchants and agency houses in Calcutta.9 (Image 1.)10 Malwa, 
in Central India, was the second significant opium-producing region. However, the region lay 
outside direct British control and its many principalities supported a flourishing network of 
cultivators, merchants and freebooters engaged in the production and transport of local opium.11 
The colonial state tried to criminalise opium production in the princely states of central and 
western India because it threatened the monopolistic profits earned from Bengal opium. However, 
the British authorities did not have the structural capability to impose complete surveillance over 
the Malwa region. Instead, the British endeavoured to profit from local trade by collecting a pass-
fee from private merchants engaged in production and sale of local opium. Unlike Bengal opium 
which was traded with East Asia through Calcutta under British watch, traffic in Malwa opium 
was directed via Bombay DQGLQYROYHGPDQ\VHFWLRQVRI,QGLD·VPHUFDQWLOHFRPPXQLW\.12  
 
While Calcutta had been a historically significant port for British commerce in India, it was only in 
the nineteenth century that Bombay rose to prominence as a port city on account of its export of 
opium and raw cotton to China.13 The Bombay trade in Malwa opium took off with the pass-fee 
system in 1831. Indian Parsis such as BombD\·V-DPVHWMHH-HMHHEKR\VHWXSDJHQF\KRXVHVWRWUDGH
with global commercial enterprises such as Jardine Matheson in Canton. The Parsi and European 
traders collaborated to make trade in opium more lucrative, establishing fleets of opium clippers 
that could sail against the monsoon winds and make multiple trips between Bombay and Canton 
within just one season.14 (Image 2.)15 
 
9 5LFKDUGV¶7KH2SLXP,QGXVWU\· 
10 Shiva Lal, Gate check, 1857. Gouache on mica. V&A 07361:15(IS), Victoria and Albert Museum, London. 
11 $PDU)DURRTXL¶7KH*OREDO&DUHHURI,QGLDQ2SLXPDQG/RFDO'HVWLQLHV·Almanack, 14 (2016), 52²73. 
12 Amar Farooqui, Opium City: The Making of Early Victorian Bombay (Gurgaon, 2006), xi²xii. 
13 Ibid. 
14 5LFKDUGV¶2SLXP,QGXVWU\· 179. It has been estimated that nearly 40 Indian-owned ships were engaged 
in the transport of opium in the 1830s. See, Farooqui, Smuggling as Subversion, 162. 
15 Walter S. Sherwill, The Opium Fleet, Opium Factory at Patna, India, ca. 1850. Lithograph 6 of 6. Wellcome 
Library, London. 
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Overlapping networks of shipping, mail movement and opium transmission: The inter-
Asian context 
 
Trade among Asian territories was historically carried out through a complex network of overland 
and sea routes and fed British imperial interests in opium as well. With the establishment of 
Company monopoly over poppy cultivation in eastern India as early as the eighteenth century, 
large native ships from Madras and later Bengal would carry valuable cargo from Calcutta to the 
Straits of Malacca, ports in Malaya and Indonesia, Manila in the Philippine Islands and Canton in 
China.16 But the subsequent breathtaking growth in ,QGLD·V opium exports to the East in the 
nineteenth century has been attributed to advances in British shipping, which provided a large 
volume of cargo space not only to European but native merchants as well and contributed to the 
overall growth of the global opium enterprise.17 A decisive moment in the history of opium was 
the establishment of commercial shipping lines such as the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company (P&O) in the 1840s. As inter-$VLDQ¶FRXQWU\WUDGH·FDPHWR rely on advanced 
steamships, Indian shipping was increasingly sidelined from the larger networks of opium 
circulation.18 Also, while both Calcutta and Bombay remained key players, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the focus of trade was shifting from Bengal to Malwa opium, which would be sent to the 
East on monthly steamers of the P&O.19 
 
(,&·VDELOLW\WRdominate the high seas had been one of the key factors behind its global successes 
at the dawn of the imperialist age and advances in communication technology would supplement 
these achievements and help safeguard British commercial interests in the nineteenth century too. 
Development in steamship technology and the drive for economy combined to create a context 
wherein the extra-legal commercial enterprise of the colonial state, i.e. illicit trade in opium, got 
tied-up with its civil administration through the medium of postal dispatches. 
 
 
16 5LFKDUGV¶2SLXP,QGXVWU\·, 76. 
17 Ibid, 264. 
18 )UHGD+DUFRXUW ¶%ODFN*ROG3	2DQGWKH2SLXP7UDGH-·International Journal of Maritime 
History, 6:1 (1994), 1²7KHWHUP¶FRXQWU\WUDGH·LVXVHGE\6LGGLTLWRGHVFribe inter-Asian maritime trade, 
LQ¶,QWURGXFWLRQ7UDGHDQG)LQDQFH-·LQ$VL\D6LGGLTLHGTrade and Finance in Colonial India, 
1750- 1860 1HZ'HOKL7KHWHUPLVXVHGWRGLVWLQJXLVKFRORQLDOLQYROYHPHQWLQ¶KRPHWUDGH·ZKLFK
was carried out by the EIC within the subcontinent. 
19 6LGGLTL¶%XVLQHVV:RUOG· 
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Up until the first half of the nineteenth century, regular mail steamers would sail from Calcutta to 
East Asia via Galle, taking nearly a month to reach their destination. Outgoing and incoming 
correspondence was charged Indian postage rates, which also defined arrangements with other 
colonial post offices in port cities such as Hong Kong and the Strait Settlements. These 
communication networks were revolutionary because they linked-up communication lines, 
economic systems and administrative structures across %ULWDLQ·V greater eastern empire. 
Nevertheless, the system proved to be expensive for the colonial government. Therefore, by the 
second half of the nineteenth century, postal communication between India and the Straits, as well 
as between India and China became almost exclusively dependent on the services provided by 
private Armenian and European commercial enterprises such as Jardine Matheson and Company, 
Jardine, Skinner and Company, and Apcar and Company.20 
 
In 1869, the postal department concluded contracts with Jardine and Apcar Companies, whereby 
opium steamers would convey mail between Calcutta, the Strait Settlements and China free of 
charge for a period of three years. In return, the colonial government pledged to not subsidise 
competitive lines of mail steamers on direct routes between Calcutta and China via the Straits. 
They were, however, allowed the freedom to conclude contracts on any other routes including 
those going via Galle, Port Blair or other ports in India or British Burma. 21 This arrangement 
suited colonial interests extremely well. The possibility of the government establishing an 
alternative contract mail service was unlikely, given the expenses this would entail. Also, the 
colonial government did not look favourably upon the partial subsidy that it was required to defray, 
on the insistence of the British Government, towards the running of 3	2·V fortnightly mail 
steamers to China.22 Unsurprisingly, a reduction in the expenses of the colonial exchequer and 
convenience of transmission made the proposed linkage a grand success. 
 
A steamer each of the Jardine and Apcar Companies sailed separately from Calcutta every month 
and took a fortnight to arrive at Hong Kong, travelling via Penang and Singapore, and returning 
by the same route. TKHVHVWHDPHUVZHUHNQRZQDV¶2SLXP6WHDPHUV·; they carried opium between 
South and East Asia, departing from Calcutta a few days after the monthly opium sales. Looking 
WR¶PDNHRSLXPVWHDPHUVJHQHUDOO\XVHIXOIRUWKHFRQYH\DQFHRIFRUUHVSRQGHQFH·the Post Office 
 
20 Proceedings of the Finance Department, Separate Revenue (Post Office) Branch, dated November 1868, 
3DUW¶$·&RQVXOWDWLRQ1RV-2, National Archives of India (NAI). 
21 NAI, Nos. 5²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK-XQH3DUW¶$· 
22 NAI, Nos. 31²2, Finance Department, Separate Revenue (Post Office) Branch, November 1868, Part 
¶$· 
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of India expressed its strong desire to make the sale of opium fortnightly, so as to allow opium 
steamers to depart bi-monthly and serve as a more attractive alternative to regular mail steamers.23 
Under agreements concluded between the Government of India and the owner-proprietors of the 
steamer companies, the time of travel, departure and arrival of vessels, the description of vessels 
to be used, the ports of call, etc. were at the discretion of the steamer companies. But it was agreed 
upon that the departure of steam vessels from Calcutta during the period of contract would be 
regulated by the monthly sale of opium by the colonial state.24 
 
ConsequentO\WKHVH¶2SLXP6WHDPHUV·FDPHWREHFODVVLILHGDV¶,QGLDQ0DLO3DFNHWV·ZKLFKZRXOG
transmit letters, newspapers and books from Calcutta to the Straits and Hong Kong, under the 
same terms and rates as were paid to British mail packets like the P&O in the preceding period.25 
This was extremely significant³once private opium steamers were transformed into contracted 
mail steamers of the colonial state, government mail was subsidised by the illegal profits earned by 
private shipping concerns through participation in the illicit opium trade.26 As opium came to be 
transported by semi-official government ships, one can only imagine the benefits that accrued to 
the British imperialist interests as a consequence. Profits that previously had to be shared with 
Britain by the Post Office of India, on account of the subsidies it had to offer to P&O for carrying 
mail, could now be rightfully retained by the colonial state itself.27 Additional advantages of the 
arrangement included simplification of postage rates across %ULWDLQ·VAsian empire, making the 
transmission of mail cheaper and quicker, and offering the possibility of sending correspondence 
further afield to America via Hong Kong.28 Consequently, as steamships transferred mails on the 
routes used to transport opium, cotton, labour, etc., there was a comprehensive linking up of 
various networks of colonial exchange. 
 
Opium smuggling along postal networks: The South Asian context 
 
 
23 Ibid. 
24 Each steamer was to leave Calcutta within 12 days, more or less, of each monthly sale of Government opium. 
7KH¶1RWLILFDWLRQE\WKH'LUHFWRU*HQHUDORIWKH3RVW2IILFHRI,QGLDGDWHGth $SULO·DGYHUWLVHGPRQWKO\
opium sales in Calcutta on 8 April, 6 May, 7 June and July, 9 August and September, 4 October, 5 November 
and 6 December. See, NAI, Nos. 5²8, Finance Department, Separate Revenue (Post Office) Branch, June 1869, 
3DUW¶$· 
25 Ibid. 
26 NAI, Nos. 31²2, Finance Department, Separate Revenue (Post Office) Branch, November 1868, Part 
¶$· 
27 Ibid. 
28 NAI, Nos. 5²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK-XQH3DUW¶$· 
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These inter-Asian networks that supported the movement of opium within a global imperialist 
context also highlight the important developments taking place within the local political economy 
and administrative structures of nineteenth century India. The infrastructural revolution, evident 
in the development of railroads, post and telegraph, shipping and administrative superstructures 
resulted in growing mobility for indigenous merchants and traders and a consequent expansion in 
domestic movement of opium.29 In supporting the growth of an international sphere of economic 
exchange ZKLFKZDVQ·W VXEVHUYLHQW VROHO\ WR WKHEIC and its global networks, Indian opium (as 
opposed to British Indian opium) benefitted from improvements in communication structures, which 
were standardised and deployed to serve the needs of local political economy.30 In the nineteenth 
century, overland trade received a boost as the practice of transmitting  parcels and packages through 
banghy, at economical rates, was introduced by the Post Office of India.31 And by enhancing facilities 
for transport and exchange to make overland trade in commodities more effective and extensive, 
official policies ended up advancing the dispatch of overland mails between Bombay and other parts 
of the British Empire as well.32 
 
Malwa 
 
Opium cultivation in Malwa, which came to threaten British opium monopoly in the subcontinent, 
involved a complex hierarchy of peasant cultivators, village moneylenders and headmen, Indian 
bankers and commission agents, etc. Despite British prohibition on poppy cultivation in Indian-
administered states, by the end of the nineteenth century, nearly 90 princely states of Rajputana, 
Bombay Presidency and Malwa-Central India Agency, ranging in size from Indore, Bhopal and 
Jaipur to Sitamau, were engaged in opium trade.33 The Company mounted pressure on these princely 
states to sell specified quantities of produce to the EIC alone. It also attempted to keep a strict vigil on 
the export of the commodity, which took place mainly through the port city of Bombay and to a lesser 
extent, through Madras and Calcutta.34 Nevertheless, Malwa opium found networks to evade the 
pass-fee system and was channeled easily into domestic and global networks of transmission. 
Domestically, Malwa opium found consumers in British-administered districts, where state-
 
29 7KRPDV$7LPEHUJ¶+LDWXVDQG,QFXEDWRU: Indigenous Trade and Traders, 1837- ·LQ6LGGLTLHG
Trade and Finance, 236. 
30 Farooqui, Opium City, xi²xii. 
31 $VKRXOGHU\RNHIRUFDUU\LQJORDGV¶SDUFHOSRVW·$OVRWKHPDQQHURIWUDQVPLWWLQJSDUFHOSRVWLQFRORQLDO
India. 
32 S. R. Bakshi, British Diplomacy and Administration in India (New Delhi, 1971), 174. See also, NAI, Nos. 30²
3, Home Department, Public Proceedings (Post Office) Branch, 19 March 1858. 
33 5LFKDUGV¶2SLXP,QGXVWU\LQ,QGLD· 
34 Farooqui, Opium City, 30. 
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licensed shops charged extortionately high prices from local consumers.35 The colonial 
government was cautious in keeping the pass-fee low to prevent the smuggling of Malwa opium 
through alternative routes passing through Portuguese Daman, Diu and Goa, or even Karachi 
before the conquest of Sind.36 From here, elaborate overseas networks would be used to ship this 
opium illegally into Burma, Macau, Canton and the Straits.37 However, large quantities of the produce 
remained outside state control and circulated within indigenously-controlled networks of exchange.38 
 
Consequently, the colonial government sought to monitor the transmission and export of Malwa 
opium by establishing a system of commercial surveillance.39 The transmission of all opium by 
SRVWH[FHSWRQWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VDFFRXQW was declared contraband.40 The British state sought to 
wrest back control over its information and trade networks by transforming them into networks 
of surveillance and control. In addition to the Postal Department, the Land and Sea Customs 
Department too would assist the colonial state in its vigilance and revenue-collection activities. 
Regular chowkies RUFXVWRPV·SRVWVZHUHHVWDEOLVKHGRQSULQFLSDO WUDGH URXWHV and could detain 
goods passing through their jurisdiction without payment of duty. The establishment itself was 
placed under surveillance, as rules and rates came to be printed in the form of manuals supplied 
to all custom houses to prevent corruption amongst local officials.41 This arrangement enabled the 
colonial state to throw a yoke of surveillance over the western coast of the Indian subcontinent.42 
 
Indian traders nonetheless found alternate routes to carry opium from Malwa to the western coast 
of the Bombay Presidency and these networks continued to flourish into the late nineteenth 
century.43 One of these routes, which avoided British-administered territories by navigating 
through locations in Rajputana (Pali and Jaisalmer) and the Bombay Presidency (Karachi) to reach 
the Portuguese-administered port of Daman, was critical for the emergence of what has been 
GHVFULEHGDVWKH¶JROGHQHUDIRU'DPDQRSLXP PDUNHW·44 The Customs Department was largely 
ineffective in preventing opium smuggling into and out of British territory. It has been estimated 
 
35 5LFKDUGV¶2SLXP,QGXVWU\LQ,QGLD· 
36 Ibid, 154. 
37 )DURRTXL¶*OREDO&DUHHU·²73. 
38 Farooqui, Opium City, 30. 
39 6LGGLTL¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·LQ6LGGLTLHGTrade and Finance, 14-15. 
40 NAI, Nos. 38²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK$XJXVW3DUW¶$· 
41 Regulation IX of 1810, quoted in Bakshi, British Diplomacy, 174. 
42 NAI, Nos. 28²+RPH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH%UDQFK-XO\3DUW¶$· 
43 NAI, Nos. 37²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH2SLXP%UDQFK'HFHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
44 Farooqui, Opium City, 31. 
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that despite surveillance, nearly 90% of the seizures carried out by Customs in this period consisted 
of petty items such as coarse blankets only!45 
 
But the illicit transmission and export of opium often benefitted the government, without its 
knowledge, in terms of revenue earnings on postage and railway. Overland customs duties and the 
pass-fee system often exceeded postal charges. Local traders came to exploit the postal system to 
move contraband opium secretively and escape higher payments to the colonial exchequer.46 The 
colonial government was thus confronted with a peculiar conflict of interest³the loss of duty on 
Malwa opium was being squared-off by earnings made on the public (mis)use of colonial networks 
of postal communication!47 
 
The smuggling of Malwa opium into the Deccan and to southern ports such as Madras was another 
source for concern. Colonial officials argued that early nineteenth century military-cum-postal routes, 
which had been laid by the Company State to expedite the movement of troops and information, 
were being used to transmit opium to Mysore and Hyderabad, through routes crisscrossing the 
region of Berar, and Bombay and Madras Presidencies.48 Though the British Collectors of Poona, 
$KPHGQDJDU%HOJDXPDQG6KRODSXUZHUHDGDPDQWWKDWWKHLU WHUULWRULHVZHUHQ·WGLUHFWO\XVHGIRU
these smuggling routes, they were forced to concede that Malwa opium was transferred on the state 
railways or through overland routes skirting British territories.49 
 
These conflicting narratives would be the cause for institutional mistrust within colonial structures 
of governance. The Madras Government, much to the displeasure of the Post Office of India, 
adopted the practice of examining postal parcels suspected of conveying contraband goods through 
its territories. This was in direct violation of postal regulations, whereby officers suspecting the 
contents of parcels could examine them only in the presence of the addressed party. The postal 
authorities were concerned about the loss of prestige and revenue for their department; they were 
against adopting surveillance measures and conducted only occasional examination of packets in the 
interest of public revenue. The Madras Government in turn was convinced that it was losing its 
 
45 -*%RUSXMDUL¶7KH,PSDFWRIWKH7UDQVLW'XW\6\VWHPLQ%ULWLVK,QGLD·LQ6LGGLTLHGTrade and Finance, 
(New Delhi: 1995), 326. 
46 NAI, Nos. 38²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK$XJXVW3DUW¶$· 
47 NAI, Nos. 11²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH2SLXP%UDQFK-XO\3DUW¶$· 
48 Mulk Raj Anand, The Story of the Indian Post Office (Delhi, 1987), 14. 
49 NAI, Nos. 37²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH2SLXP%UDQFK'HFHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
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reputation and revenue, as the public took recourse to postal smuggling in order to evade customs 
duties.50 
 
The rise in opium smuggling through the post was in fact preceded by the official deployment of 
the post for conveying state-controlled opium in the wake of standardisation under the Postal Act 
of 1837. But as the postal service was made available to a greater section of the paying public, there 
was an attendant rise in postal usage for transmitting contraband articles by general members of 
the public. As a result, under the Postal Act of 1866, the transmission of opium by the post office, 
except on government account, was prohibited. Informers who notified the authorities of any 
transgression could claim a reward, while those convicted had to pay penalties under the VWDWH·V
excise laws.51 Nevertheless, opium came to be discovered increasingly in postal parcels entering the 
Madras Presidency and forced colonial authorities to consider penal laws for regulating the 
transport, possession and sale of opium within British territories.52 
 
Burma 
 
Smuggling of opium was not confined to Malwa opium alone. In the eastern parts of the Indian 
subcontinent, smuggling of Bengal opium into British Burma was fed by domestic demand. 
Domestic consumption of opium in India and Burma had a long history. The practice was tied to 
factors such as climate, difficult living conditions and strenuous labour regimes; opium also had 
medicinal and health usages.53 But perhaps most significantly, opium use was integrated into the 
socio-cultural fabric of local community life on the Indian subcontinent, and had implications for 
leisure activities, hospitality and ritualistic norms, child nurture, etc.54 Some of the opium grown in 
Burma was also sent to China.55 As with British India, the colonial state in Burma too sought to 
regulate the production and transmission of opium for both local consumption and international 
trade. The drug could only be sold through a limited number of licensed vendors in Burma, while 
its cultivation and transport were outlawed completely.56 
 
50 NAI, Nos. 38²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK$XJXVW3DUW¶$· 
51 NAI, No. 10, Finance Department, Separate RHYHQXH3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK6HSWHPEHU3DUW¶%· 
52 NAI, Nos. 81²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH2SLXP%UDQFK'HFHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
53 Ashley Wright, Opium and Empire in Southeast Asia: Regulating Consumption in British Burma (Basingstoke: 
2014), 1, 152²5; Roy Anderson, Drug Smuggling and Taking in India and Burma (Calcutta; Simla: 1922), 35. 
54 . . *DQJXO\ + . 6KDUPD . $ 9 5 .ULVKQDPDFKDUL ¶An Ethnographic Account of Opium 
Consumers of Rajasthan (India): SocioǦPHGLFDO3HUVSHFWLYH·Addiction: Journal of the Society for the Study of 
Addiction, 90: 1(1995), 9²12. 
55 NAI, Nos. 70²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH%UDQFK)HEUXDU\3DUW¶%· 
56 NAI, Nos. 1²3, Finance Department, Separate Revenue (Excise) BUDQFK6HSWHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
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The district of Burma was connected to India through three avenues³Rangoon, Akyab and 
Moulmein. By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it was believed that most of the opium 
smuggled into Burma came from the Calcutta Post Office.57 Under the Opium Act of 1878, the 
import of opium into Burma was prohibited. However, the Act failed to provide provisions for 
postal surveillance. Parcels suspected of containing contraband opium could not be opened without 
the presence of the addressee; the latter invariably failed to turn up when summoned for inspection.58 
 
The authorities in Burma laid the blame on postal authorities in Calcutta, Chittagong and other 
Indian towns, and demanded the examination of postal packets at the point of origin.59 The 
Director General of the Post Office of India objected to this accusation that the post office might 
actually be facilitating the smuggling of opium. The arguments between the two sides focused on 
issues of legal access to postal surveillance and the question of responsibility. While the post-
master on the receiving side could summon the addressee of the suspected article, post offices on 
the dispatch side could only mark articles as suspect to draw the attention of the receiving post 
office. Nevertheless, the Postal Department agreed to issue special instructions to the Calcutta and 
Madras post offices and the Railway Mail Service with regard to the preparation of postal bags for 
Burma, while emphasising that special vigil would have to be maintained within Burma itself.60 
 
The acceptance of only limited responsibility over the issue of postal smuggling of opium reflects 
colonial preoccupation with maintaining public confidence in the functioning of its 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQV\VWHP7KH'LUHFWRU*HQHUDOFOHDUO\VWDWHG¶7KHREMHFWRIWKH*RYHUQPHQWLVQRW
so much to ensure the detection of offenders, as to prevent the use of the Post Office for the 
purpose of smuggling RSLXP«·61 Departmental disagreement and lack of clarity with regard to 
policies of administration and governance created a situation wherein leakages within institutional 
structures undermined the very networks which were established to strengthen British control 
over India. Consequently, inter-regional smuggling of opium through the post office could not be 
checked effectively.  In order to escape detection, the addresses on such packages tended to be 
 
57 Ibid. 
58 NAI, Nos. 447²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH%UDQFK1RYHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
59 NAI, Nos. 409²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK¶/HWWHUIURPWKH6HFUHWDU\WRWKH)LQDQFLDO
Commissioner, Burma, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma, dated 4th 0D\·-XQH
3DUW¶$· 
60 ¶'2E\$8)DQVKDZHGDWHGrd -XQH·Ibid. 
61 NAI, Nos. 447²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH%UDQFK¶'2E\$8)DQVKDZHGDWHG
26th $XJXVW·1RYHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
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bogus in many circumstances.62 The postal authorities of Burma were often left without a culprit, 
even though the crime was committed frequently. 
 
The method of addressing packets containing contraband articles was complicated by the apparent 
complicity of postal officials. Contraband parcels were sometimes addressed to European or 
Eurasian clerks of the local post office. When asked to take delivery, they would claim that the 
parcels were not intended for them. In one instance, the head clerk of Rangoon Post Office was 
implicated in the transmission, if not smuggling, of six parcels containing 3,000 tolas of opium.63 
As an increasing number of postal personnel came under suspicion, examination of parcels was 
undertaken by deputy and assistant post masters, generally in the presence of the post master 
himself. More often than not, smaller post offices in Burma would receive contraband parcels, 
where it was difficult to ensure proper examination and disposal of smuggled opium. This is 
significant because Burma had been annexed as recently as 1885 and colonial authorities did not 
have access to sophisticated administrative structures to assist in matters of rule and governance, 
especially in the interiors.64 Given such limitations, the prosecution of postal officials proved to be 
extremely difficult under the Excise Act, and while they were usually convicted for forgery, they 
would escape punishment on technical grounds.65 
 
Opium trafficking through postal channels continued well into the twentieth century, especially as the 
transport and possession of opium did not qualify as an offence. Only the act of export could be 
prosecuted.66 The problem was compounded by loopholes in postal conventions, but also by the 
peculiar conundrum faced by colonial postal authorities. Any measure to stamp out opium smuggling 
through postal networks would involve the admission of structural weakness in the state apparatus, 
which would lead to the loss of public confidence and forfeiture of earnings made from postal 
transmissions, even if illegal. Thus, while trafficking in opium benefitted the postal system, postal 
networks facilitated the growth of opium trade. 
 
Conclusion 
 
62 NAI, Nos. 409²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW3RVW2IILFH%UDQFK¶'2E\$8)DQVKDZHGDWHGrd June 
·-XQH3DUW¶$· 
63 This was the base unit of mass in the British Indian system of weights and measures introduced in 1833, 
although it had been in use for much longer. It was also used in Aden and Zanzibar: in the latter, one tola 
was equivalent to 175.90 troy grains (0.97722222 British tolas, or 11.33980925 grams). 
64 (&KHZ¶7KH:LWKGUDZDORIWKH/DVW%ULWLVK5HVLGHQF\IURP8SSHU%XUPDLQ·Journal of Southeast 
Asian History, 10:2 (1969), 253²278. 
65 NAI, Nos. 70²1, Finance Department, 6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH%UDQFK)HEUXDU\3DUW¶%· 
66 NAI, Nos. 81²)LQDQFH'HSDUWPHQW6HSDUDWH5HYHQXH2SLXP%UDQFK'HFHPEHU3DUW¶$· 
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The colonial authorities were ineffective in stamping out the smuggling of opium completely. An 
entrenched characteristic of British presence in India was the unshakable anxiety over the security 
and stability of their Empire. Unsurprisingly, this insecurity found expression in the fiction of 
intrigue and the perceived untrustworthiness of the native collaborator.67 The consequent 
preoccupation with achieving comprehensive imperial mastery over the subcontinent would lead 
the colonial state to undertake one of the largest and most penetrative exercises of knowledge 
production in the history of empires.68 The networks of the British Empire³its communication 
lines and channels of commodity exchange came to refashion the meaning of distance and space, 
as well as control and intervention to such an extent that colonial presence became an increasingly 
encompassing and intrusive feature of everyday life in nineteenth-century India.69 
 
This intrusiveness and supposed completeness of control may highlight the surveillance 
capabilities and ambitions of an expanding empire. But the surveillance aspect of colonial authority 
was undermined by the avowed liberalising principles of communication. Often, the colonial state 
struggled to safeguard the privacy of its subjects through the very structures that were set up to 
police them. This reveals seepages within the intertwined structures of modern governance, which 
provided a space for the upending of hard-fought colonial order.70 
 
The significance of trade in opium, and the consequent linking-up of networks of economic 
transfer, information exchange and surveillance, is of immense historical significance. But this 
characteristic of inter-imperial state formation is very specific to an imperial context, which was 
VKDSHGE\,QGLD·VFHQWUDOLW\WRWKHJOREDO%ULWLVK(PSLUHDQGLWVH[SDQVLRQColonial experience in 
India allowed for contradicting realities, wherein state control over means of exchange was inching 
 
67 ¶5H-DUUDQJHPHQWRI&LYLO2IILFHV%HQJDO·GDWHG1RYLQ$OOHQ·V,QGLDQ0DLODQG2IILFLDO*D]HWWH. 
Published on the Arrival of Each Overland Mail. Vol. XXXI.³No. 1084 (London: 1851), 1072. This position 
was contrary to the early colonial attitudes towards domestic consumption of opium in India, which were 
couched in paternalistic, moral tones, but were in reality aimed at safeguarding British global economic 
interests. See, 51HZPDQ¶(DUO\%ULWLVK(QFRXQWHUVZLWKWKH,QGLDQ2SLXP(DWHU·LQ-+0LOOVDQG3
Barton (ed.) Drugs and Empires: Essays in Modern Imperialism and Intoxication 1500-1930 (New York: 2007), 66²
$OVRVHH5LFKDUGV¶7KH,QGLDQ(PSLUH· 
68 Christopher Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870 
(Cambridge: 1996); Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton, 1996); 
Nicholas Dirks (ed.), Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor, 1992). 
69 '*XSWD¶6WDPSLQJ(PSLUH3RVWDO6WDQGDUGL]DWLRQLQ1LQHWHHQWK&HQWXU\,QGLD·LQPatrick Manning 
and Daniel Rood (eds.) Global Scientific Practice in an Age of Revolutions, 1750-1850 (Pittsburgh: 2016), 216²
236. 
70 Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Berkeley: 
1997). 
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towards absolutism, but multiple spheres of local insurgence against colonial authority were also 
made available by the expanding scope of postal networks in a nineteenth-century context. The 
Empire itself was de-territorialised, as the physical networks of the Empire came to embody not 
just movement but also historical change. The story that emerges from the spread of these 
networks is one of connected histories linking South Asia and the greater British Empire. The 
historical journey of Indian opium needs to be considered not just to chart these networks, but to 
GHVWDELOLVH LGHDVRI ¶FHQWUH· DQG¶SHULSKHU\· LQRUGHU WR locate historical processes within trans-
regional networks of transmission and exchange.71 
 
This paper highlights the institutional cooption of the state structure in officially subsidising and 
mounting an illegal, global enterprise, which would have exploitative and destructive consequences 
which remain largely unparalleled in history. Smuggling is generally understood to describe trading 
activity that is carried out without the sanction of the ruling political entity or prevalent legal norms. 
In the context of the present study on opium, the ability of the British Empire to institute a 
distinction between licit and illicit smuggling is of immense significance. Through its own 
involvement with global shipping firms, agency houses, trading enterprises and the colonial state 
in India, British imperial interests not only oppressed the local peasantry, trading classes and 
HFRQRPLFLQVWLWXWLRQVEXWDOVRWLHG,QGLD·VSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\LQH[WULFDEO\ZLWKWKHUXLQRXVLPSRUW
of opium into China. This is proof of the immense ideological impact of imperialist expansion on 
structures and networks of rule and governance in the nineteenth century, and its ability to 
manipulate public discourse and historical memory. In the words of Roy Anderson, 
6XSHULQWHQGHQW %XUPD ([FLVH 'HSDUWPHQW ¶(YHU\ERG\ LV D VPXJJOHU DW KHDUW·72 This was 
especially true for the political economy of opium which took shape around British India and its 
imperial outposts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
 
Reflections 
 
The literary corpus on eighteenth and nineteenth century opium has engaged with aspects of the 
opium sensorium, and the subject of consumption and its impact on social and individual identity, 
morality, etc., with a preferred focus on the experiences of the metropole.73 However, these 
 
71 Metcalf, Imperial Connections, 2007; Ghosh and Kennedy (eds.), Decentering Empire, 2006; Bayly, Birth of the 
Modern World, 2004; Christopher Bayly, Imperial Meridian: The British Empire and the World 1780²1830 
(London; New York: 1989). 
72 Anderson, Drug Smuggling, 1. 
73 5HIHUWRWKH¶,QWURGXFWLRQ·WRWKLVYROXPHE\-RVHSKLQHMcDonagh and Briony Wickes. 
 15 
experiences derived from a particular socio-cultural milieu, which was shaped by the political and 
financial ambitions of a globalising imperialist project. The colonial monopolisation of opium 
production in India and its smuggOLQJLQWR(DVWDQG6RXWKHDVW$VLDWREDODQFH%ULWDLQ·VDGGLFWLRQ
to tea; the demonisation of local Asian cultures of medicinal or social opium consumption; the 
VXEVHTXHQWVSUHDGRIWKH¶QHIDULRXV·RSLXPGHQVLQ/RQGRQ; these are some themes which are 
common to historical and literary enquiry, and they all highlight the importance of practices of 
production, transmission and intent.74 It is the historical discipline which seeks to establish the 
socio-economic context and provenance of practices of opium cultivation and transmission. It is 
incumbent upon historians to reconstruct the institutional, infrastructural, and political bulwark 
supporting networks of conquest and communication, which are integral to stories of empire-
building, extraction and management. These histories also highlight the experiences and 
motivations of local-level collaborators and contenders to this seemingly ruthless march of 
LPSHULDOLVW¶IUHHWUDGH·, which was unleased upon the colonial world in the guise of modern, liberal 
politico-fiscal structures. By highlighting the hitherto unexplored inter-linkages between histories 
of shipping, postal and opium transmission, this paper constructs a new geography of imperialism 
shaped by the localised roots and inter-imperial expanse RI WKHSK\VLFDOQHWZRUNVRI%ULWDLQ·V
Indian Empire. 
 
Colonial histories of mobility, focused on themes such as cartography, shipping, mail movement, 
commodity trade and smuggling; migration, slavery and indenture, etc., underscore the importance 
of formal and informal circulatory networks, which emerged out of the Indian subcontinent and 
linked-up the colonial world into one historical entity. The standardisation and reinvention of the 
colonial networks of communication over the long nineteenth century illustrates the intertwined 
destinies of people, nations and technologies, as is evident in the story of the famous East 
Indiaman, Ibis, which transported slaves, opium and indentured labour through its long career as 
 
74 Adam Colman, Drugs and the Addiction Aesthetic in Nineteenth-Century Literature (Basingstoke, 2019); Erika 
Rappaport, A Thirst for Empire: How Tea Shaped the Modern World (Princeton, 2019); Markman Ellis, Matthew 
Mauger and Richard Coulton (eds.) Empire of Tea: The Asian Leaf That Conquered the World (London, 2015); 
$VKOH\:ULJKW¶1RW-XVWD´ 3ODFHIRUWKH6PRNLQJRI2SLXPµ7KH,QGLDQRSLXPGHQDQGLPSHULDODQ[LHWLHV
in the 1890s, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 18:2 (2017); Hans Derks, History of the Opium Problem 
(Leiden, 2013); $OHVVDQGUD&RQWHQWL5XGG\
V
,QGLDQ
VPLOH8QNQRZQSRUWUDLWVRI5XG\DUG.LSOLQJ·The 
British Art Journal, 11;3 (2011), 57²-D\+DPPRQG¶6SHDNLQJRI2SLXP2ZQHUVKLSDQG6HWWOHU&RORQLDO
'LVSRVVHVVLRQ·Settler Colonial Studies, 1:2 (2011), 103²26; Louise Foxcroft, The Making of Addiction: The 'Use 
and Abuse' of Opium in Nineteenth-Century Britain (London, 2006); Zheng Yangwen, The Social Life of Opium in 
China (Cambridge, 2005); Virginia Berridge, Opium Eating: Responses to Opiate Use in Nineteenth-
Century England, Victorian Studies, 21:4 (978), 437²61; 5XG\DUG.LSOLQJ¶Mr. Rudyard Kipling On The 
2SLXP4XHVWLRQ·The British Medical Journal, 2:2084 (1900), 1656²57. 
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a vehicle of inter-Asian imperialism.75 GKRVK·VIbis Trilogy, for e.g., is an important contribution 
from within the field of literary studies, to the study of a historical period shaped by globally 
crisscrossing networks of trade, migration and communication³a theme which is the focus of 
this paper.76 In exploring the changing destinies of both people and technology under 
imperialism³evident in the fate of individual actors with complex histories, who were 
collaborating with and contesting against colonial authority at different junctures and forging new 
and ever-changing alliances and identities, but also in the transformative materiality of the physical 
networks and their agents, such as the schooner Ibis in the Sea of Poppies, we discover the very deep 
rootedness of this story in the historical archives of the colonial state in India.77 
 
This paper is based almost exclusively on colonial records from nineteenth century India. The 
FRORQLDOVWDWH·VREVHVVLYHSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKFROOHFWLQJDQGFROODWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQDERXW ,QGLD·V 
territories and its people, and their subsequent colonisation reflect British imperial anxiety with 
physical and ideological domination of the subcontinent from their position as outsiders. 
Consequently, colonial rulers left behind one of the most extensive and well-documented 
archives.78 Undoubtedly, much colonial knowledge was based on methods of enquiry, collection 
and classification that have been rendered suspect by postcolonial enquiry.79 But it is this 
qualification which also encourages the view that archivHVRXJKWWREHUHJDUGHGQRWMXVWDV¶VLWHV
of knowledge retrieval, but of knowledge production, as monuments of states as well as sites of 
VWDWHHWKQRJUDSK\·80 
 
The colonial archive is thus not just a historical repository, but also a textual and/or literary archive. 
Its content and materiality highlight the forms and languages of expression, silences and 
 
75 Amitav Ghosh, Sea of Poppies (New York, 2008). 
76 The three books in this trilogy, Sea of Poppies (2008), River of Smoke (2011) and Flood of Fire (2015) look at 
the nineteenth century story of trade in opium between India and China, and the trafficking of indentured 
labour from India to Mauritius. 
77 BinayDN5R\¶5HDGLQJDIIHFWLYHFRPPXQLWLHVLQDWUDQVQDWLRQDOVSDFHLQ$PLWDY*KRVK·VSea of Poppies·
Nordic Journal of English Studies, 15:1 (2016), 47²70; $QXSDPD $URUD ¶´7KH 6HD LV +LVWRU\µ 2SLXP
&RORQLDOLVPDQG0LJUDWLRQLQ$PLWDY*KRVK·VSea of Poppies·Ariel: A Review of International English Literature, 
42:3²4 (2012), 21²42; .0&KDQGHU¶-RXUQH\WRWKH$QWLTXH/DQGRI3RSSLHV9R\DJHDV'LVFRYHU\LQ
$PLWDY*KRVK·V´6HDRI3RSSLHVµ·Indian Literature, 54:4 (2010), 181²92; &XUWLV0DUH]¶7KH2WKHU$GGLFW
5HIOHFWLRQVRQ&RORQLDOLVPDQG2VFDU:LOGH·V2SLXP6PRNH6FUHHQµELH, 64:1 (1997), 257²87. 
78 Bhavani Raman, Document Raj: Writing and Scribes in Early Colonial South India (Chicago, 2012). 
79 Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of India (Princeton, 2001); Ronald Inden, Imagining 
India (Bloomington, 2000). 
80 $QQ/DXUD6WROHU¶&RORQLDO$UFKLYHVDQGWKH$UWVRI*RYHUQDQFH·Archival Science, 2 (2002), 87. 
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recollections, that were adopted by the colonial rulers and allowed to survive in time, historically.81 
$UFKLYDOFROOHFWLRQVDUHD¶GLJHVW·RIrecords, produced by officials and therefore, they are the first 
step of the historiographical exercise.82 As a consequence, WKHSURFHVVRI¶PLQLQJDQGXQGHUPLQLQJ
RI WKH FRORQLDO DUFKLYHV· RXJKW WR EH RQH RI WKH SULPDU\ FRQFHUQV RI D KLVWRULDQ VHHNLQJ WR
reconstruct any aspect of the colonial past. This is because history writing needs evidence for its 
articulation and DVD¶FRORQLDOSROLFHPDQPDUFKLQJRXWZDUGVIURPWKHDUFKLYHV·WKHKLVWRULDQPXVW
have a thorough knowledge of the archives they are seeking to destabilise.83 
 
The historical narrative is constructed from the analysis of archival documents. Interface with 
governmental primary sources serves the obvious end of elucidating the official position of the 
colonial state, but more significantly, it allows the historian to unearth the nuanced and often 
contradictory relationship that existed between the state and its subjects. Constant engagement 
and re-engagement with the colonial archive provides a platform for the emergence of more 
creative forms of colonial encounters. This helps complicate and enliven the simplistic political 
history of regulations and policies that are usually regarded as the hallmark of colonial archives. 
As a result, the colonial archives become the site of inscription of power relations, as well as tricky 
technologies of rule. This underscores the existence of politics of knowledge, which underlay 
processes of state- and empire-building in the nineteenth century. 
 
In fact, the subject of knowledge-making and transmission of information, both ideological but 
also material, is one of the central themes of this paper and unexpectedly throws light on everyday 
practices of governance, the varied and complex extractive gestures of imperialism and social 
encounters, and the intrusions of a political philosophy which found itself unsettled and insecure 
in a new, unfamiliar surroundings. Perhaps most significantly, the colonial archive implicitly reveals 
the scale of global allusion to the story of localised colonial encounters in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. This research therefore offers a fresh perspective to the study of global and 
transregional histories, by situating the locality within the unassailable discipline of area-studies. 
 
81 6DQGK\D6KHWW\DQG(OL]DEHWK-DQH%HOODP\¶Postcolonialism's Archive Fever·Diacritics, 30:1 (2000), 25²
48. 
82 $FRQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ6KXGGKDEUDWD6HQJXSWD5DYL.DQWDQG6KDKLG$PLQDERXW ¶KLVWRU\DQGWKH
DUFKLYHV·GDWHG1RYHPEHU&XEERQ3DUN%DQJDORUH http://pad.ma/BG/info, last accessed on 
10 January 2016. 
83 $YLQDVK¶,WLKDVEDQDPVPULWLLWLKDVNDU6KDKLG$PLQVHEDDWFKHHW·Bahuvachan, 8, 72²94. 
